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Abstract
This article develops a comparative and recursive approach to political ontology by drawing on the
ontological turn in anthropology. It claims that if ontological commitments define reality, then the
use of ontology by recent pluralist political theorists must undercut pluralism. By charting con-
temporary anthropology’s rereading of structuralism as part of a plural understanding of ontology,
it will be shown that any political ontology places limits on the political, and thus cannot exhaust
political experience. This position will be established through an analysis of the role of Claude Le´vi-
Strauss in the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and a comparison with the political
ontology represented by perspectivism and potential affinity. Anthropology’s lesson for
political theory is that ontology cannot simply be revised and treated in the singular, but that
political ontologies must be analysed comparatively to reveal the shortcomings of, and recursively
alter, one’s own political frame of reference.
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As part of a turn to ontology in political theory, recent pluralist and radical democratic
theory has turned to ontological reasoning to justify its claims, by challenging the image
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of ontology as singular, universal and static (Mihai et al. 2017).1 Through critiques of
foundations (Marchart 2007) and appeals to the themes of lack and abundance (Tønder
and Thomassen 2005), these thinkers argue that a commitment to pluralism is not just
possible but necessary, due to the unstable, continually changing and ultimately contest-
able nature of reality (Hay 2011, 474).2 A paradox exists in this position, however. If, by
definition, ontological commitments define reality, then to what extent can ontological
reasoning underpin a commitment to plurality, contingency and transformation? Where
does ontology – no matter how much it is committed to difference – begin to short-circuit
pluralism? This article will investigate this question by providing an account of how one
such form of this ontologically grounded pluralism forecloses the character of the polit-
ical, found in the principle of antagonism put forward by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal
Mouffe. This will be accompanied by the development of comparative and recursive
methodological principles adopted from contemporary anthropology which present
ontological claims as plural, rather than singular. The benefit of these principles will
be demonstrated through a recursive comparison between antagonism and an alternative
political ontology, represented by the concepts of perspectivism and potential affinity
presented in the work of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. The consequence of this compar-
ison will be the claim that neither political ontology can account for the others position,
and that pluralist political thought must, therefore, treat ontology in the plural if it is to
resist its foreclosure of other forms of politics.
The structuralism of Claude Le´vi-Strauss will act as a link between these points for
two reasons. First, Le´vi-Strauss is an implicit yet largely unacknowledged influence in
Laclau and Mouffe’s account of antagonism. Acquiescence to the post-structuralist
reading of Le´vi-Strauss as responsible for turning contingent and local binary opposi-
tions into transcendental and fixed structures, however, leads to a failure to acknowledge
the resources his work provides for thinking the ontological in the plural.3 The second
reason for orienting our consideration of political ontology around his work will be the
construction of an alternative route from his to work to a pluralist account of ontology.
As part of the recent ‘ontological turn’ in anthropology (Holbraad and Pederson 2017),
the work of Phillipe Descola (2009, 2013), Martin Holbraad (2013), Patrice Maniglier
(2010, 2016) and Viveiros de Castro (2014) challenges the intensely transcendental
image of Le´vi-Strauss to provide an alternate account of structuralism that emphasizes
the resources his work provides for thinking ontological pluralism.4 This turn focuses on
how ethnographic contexts are structured by distinct ontological presuppositions that
underpin political and social relations, and that these categories are not necessarily
reducible to the conceptual coordinates of the anthropologist. From this perspective, the
question that haunts political philosophies that inherit the post-structuralist critique of
structuralism is whether the ontology of difference and unstable identity can account for
political ontologies that are irreducible to its categories.
Anthropology’s ontological turn does not only provide a manner of identifying this
problem with political ontology but also the methodological materials for moving
beyond it. Key here is the replacement of an image of structuralism as transcendental
schematism with an image of structure as transformation. The various ontological prin-
ciples studied by anthropology are not possessed of strict, timeless identity but only
attain their meaning through a series of transformations. In this reading of Le´vi-Strauss,
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transformation underpins a fundamentally pluralist approach to the ontological and
metaphysical coordinates of anthropological investigation that necessitates a commit-
ment to two methodological principles. First, systems of thought are not meaningful
outside of a series of transformations. Consequently, meaning can only be attributed to
them through a comparative method. Second, these comparisons induce a recursive
effect, insofar as the system of differences implied by transformation forces the anthro-
pologist to continually revise their conceptual categories. What will be argued here is
that these tools can be productively applied to political ontology in a manner that benefits
the pluralist project. Comparison underpins a commitment to multiple ontological
images of politics, which can induce a recursive reconsideration of the coordinates held
by any one particular theory. Such a methodology would aid in responding to the
aforementioned paradox of ontological pluralism by refusing to treat pronouncements
on the character of being as singular.
It must be acknowledged that the ontological turns of political theory and anthropol-
ogy use the term ontology differently. Political ontology, represented here by the work of
Laclau and Mouffe, seeks to generate political claims from the consideration of the
‘being’ of social and political entities, events and relations (Hay 2011). Ontology is
explicitly mobilized as a tool for understanding the nature of politics. Contrastingly, the
ontological turn in anthropology does not seek to produce general ontological principles
from anthropological investigation. Instead, it uses ethnographic material from alternate
ontological viewpoints to recursively critique the anthropologists own ontological
assumptions (Holbraad and Pederson 2017, 24). For these thinkers, there is no single
answer to the ontological question of how social and political relations are formed.
Within the scope of this argument, ontology will be defined by drawing on both the
political and anthropological turns: a reflection upon the nature of politics according to
an understanding of being, and a recursive criticism of how these presuppositions shape
the limits of the political.
Thus, our task will not be to correct the mismatch between ontology and pluralism by
simply developing ‘better’ ontological principles more conducive to supporting pluralist
politics. Nor will it be, as critics have highlighted, to simply show how political ontology
abstracts from concrete problems and politics and forecloses possibilities for understand-
ing the political field (Dean 2005; Kioupkiolis 2011; Norris 2006; Norval 2005, 87).
Instead, it will be to build on the claim that Laclau and Mouffe’s use of particular
ontological perspectives obscures the possibility of other conceptions of politics (Arditi
2014; Rekret 2014). This claim will not be made by referring to the ‘real conditions’ of
politics that are abstracted from McNay (2014), defending them from this criticism
(Stavrakakis 2014), or by asserting the uncertainty and openness of their ontological
claims (Newman 2001, 163–66). In contrast, it will be argued that the comparative and
recursive approach to the ontology of antagonism adopted from contemporary anthro-
pology can productively rethink the role of ontology in pluralist political theory, allow-
ing the formation of a pluralist account of political ontology itself. This claim responds to
the concerns of the above authors, insofar as it will be conceded that ontological prin-
ciples obscure other forms of politics, but moves beyond this work to argue that the
ontological pluralism to be adopted from anthropology provides materials for the recur-
sive reconsideration of what the political is. This will be demonstrated by a brief,
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recursive comparison between antagonism and Viveiros de Castro’s account of perspec-
tivism and the kinship structure of potential affinity, in order to show how neither
antagonism nor affinity can account for the claims of the other. Political ontology,
therefore, must be treated in the plural. From this position, political ontology in the
singular, insofar as it makes claims about the character of reality, cannot fully account
for the plurality of ways of understanding political life.
This claim will proceed as follows. First, Laclau and Mouffe’s political ontology of
antagonism will be traced back to the work of Le´vi-Strauss by emphasizing his role as a
link between structuralist linguistics and the post-structuralist understanding of dis-
course. This will then provide the opportunity to form an alternate path forward from
Le´vi-Strauss through the reading of his work given by Descola, Holbraad, Maniglier and
Viveiros de Castro. This account will focus on the two methodological principles of
ontological pluralism: comparison and recursivity. The third section and the conclusion
will give a brief demonstration of these principles. A juxtaposition and comparison will
be set up between antagonism and Viveiros de Castro’s presentation of what he terms
‘Amerindian perspectivism’ and the related form of kinship he terms potential affinity, in
order to show how his account of this contrasting political ontology emphasizes the
potential for alliance rather than antagonism in group formation. This account will be
situated within a broader perspective on the place of the ontological turn in anthropology
with respect to critiques of the representation of ethnographic data in modern anthro-
pology. The conclusions we will arrive at through this analysis will be twofold. First, that
the work of the ontological turn can be used to recursively reconsider the way in which
Laclau and Mouffe place limits on the political through their use of antagonism. Second,
that both ontological turns are caught in the problem of limiting their analyses of political
and social life through the representation of ethnographic and political data in transcen-
dental ontological schemes. The recursive pay-off of what follows will be that any
ontological representation, whether political or anthropological, must consider the ethi-
cal pitfalls of its analytical position in order to sustain a pluralist ontological project.
Tracing antagonism as ontological principle back to
Le´vi-Strauss
Le´vi-Strauss’s foundational influence upon Laclau and Mouffe rests on their repeated
assertion of the centrality of the ontology of antagonism within their understanding of the
political. For the Laclau and Mouffe of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, thinking the
political ontologically is central to understanding hegemony: ‘if a relation of hegemonic
representation is to be possible, its ontological status has to be defined’ (Laclau and
Mouffe 2001, x). Hegemony’s articulation of a single narrative identity can only be
understood through the ontological processes by which it is produced. Since this joint
publication, the recourse to the language of ontology has been consistently supported by
both Laclau and Mouffe. Laclau’s last work is explicitly presented as the continuation of
a project aimed at ‘the construction of a political ontology’ (Laclau 2014, 1) which is
described elsewhere as ‘absolutely constitutive’ of political identity (Laclau 1996, 61).
Similarly, Mouffe emphasizes the need for an ‘ontological approach’ (Mouffe 2013, 79),
reinforcing her earlier claim that the political ‘is inherent to every human society’ and
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‘determines our very ontological condition’ (Mouffe 1993, 2). What is at stake for both is
that neglecting this ontological realm holds back both the analytical capacities of polit-
ical theory and the practical possibilities of any pluralist project.
This ontology is defined by the principle of antagonism. Antagonism is constitutive of
politics because any identity is formed by its negation of an outside that does not con-
form to its specific subject position. This is developed through the structuralist linguis-
tics of Ferdinand de Saussure and the post-structuralist elaboration on his insights in the
work of Jacques Derrida. While Laclau and Mouffe engage in discussion with other
debates and philosophical sources, such as questions of spatiality and the difference
between the social and the political (Marchart 2014), these themes are subordinate to
the discursive understanding of antagonism (Povinelli 2012). Ultimately, antagonism is
only possible due to the lack of any essential relationship between signs and what they
signify. Identity is formed through an arbitrary articulation of a particular set of signs,
one which must include an antagonistic exclusion of other possible articulations of that
system. This is precisely why Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of the ontological dimen-
sion of antagonism is also a theory of hegemony. Antagonism is primary because there is
no essential organization of a system of signs, and therefore no identity that is not
articulated politically, or hegemonically.
It is this commitment to the linguistic basis of antagonism that allows this ontological
principle to be traced back to Le´vi-Strauss’s structuralism. While the influence of struc-
turalism, on Laclau in particular, has been noted (Gasche´ 2004), this path will be retro-
dden in order to lead to an alternate approach to ontology that can be derived from the
structuralist perspective. Two moments are of particular importance. The first occurs in
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy where the above-mentioned reliance upon Saussure
and Derrida comes to light. Laclau and Mouffe draw on these thinkers to claim that it is
‘not from an underlying intelligible principle’ that political identities are produced, ‘but
from the regularity of a system of structural positions’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 106). It
is by way of the hegemonic articulation of signs that identity is possible, consigning the
antagonism between the inside and the outside of identity to contingency rather than
necessity. Laclau and Mouffe declare this the ‘decisive point of their argument’, noting
that its ramification is the impossibility of doing away with both non-fixity and fixity
(Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 111). This move involves citing Derrida at length, drawing on
his reading of Le´vi-Strauss, where he makes the now well-known argument that signs
only receive their meaning through their difference to other signs, and thus that there can
be no reduction of any linguistic system to a single, central meaning anchored in a self-
referential centre (Derrida 2001, 354). For Laclau and Mouffe, this draws structural
linguistics to its conclusion, where the limits of any system are contingently articulated
but must in some way be partially fixed: ‘in order to differ, to subvert meaning, there has
to be a meaning’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 112). The necessity of this partial closure is
made with reference to Saussure, who for Laclau and Mouffe demonstrated that ‘the
meaning of a term was purely relational and determined only by its opposition to all the
others’, demonstrating the necessity of closure for identity (Laclau and Mouffe 2001,
113). Identity is antagonistic, and political, because its constitutive operation halts the
competing attempts to articulate the signs that form the accepted terms of politics.
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By citing Derrida’s reading of Le´vi-Strauss before transitioning to the work of Saus-
sure, Laclau and Mouffe’s position rests on the fact that it is through Le´vi-Strauss’s
reading of Saussure that Derrida’s position with regard to the sign is possible. Derrida
reads structuralism in two directions. First, he claims that ‘in the work of Le´vi-Strauss it
must be recognised that the respect for structurality, for the internal originality of the
structure, compels a neutralization of time and history’, and second, that this respect for
structure incorporates ‘chance and discontinuity’ in the transition between particular
structural systems (Derrida 2001, 369). According to Derrida, despite his apparent
upholding of both fixity and discontinuity, it is the former which takes precedence,
belying Le´vi-Strauss’s nostalgic search for origins. It is through this consideration and
critique of structural anthropology’s apparent aim to reach that which is outside of
history that Derrida seeks to point to the impossibility of such closure, and thus the
permanent deferral of the possibility of a self-sufficient system of signs. By taking on
Saussurian linguistics by way of Derrida’s critique of Le´vi-Strauss’s adoption of the
structuralist method, Laclau and Mouffe implicitly incorporate Le´vi-Strauss’s work in
their own through the pivotal role he plays for Derrida’s rethinking of the sign.
The second key moment for linking the theory of antagonism back to Le´vi-Strauss lies
in Laclau’s reliance on the notion of empty and floating signifiers to conceptualize how
political articulation draws disparate signs together within a unified identity. Empty
signifiers refer to no particular signified but play a role in fixing the system of differences
between signs, thus constituting a linguistic system. For Laclau, empty signifiers are
integral to the antagonistic character of discourse for three reasons. First, the need to
exclude certain relationships between signs means that the unity of a system cannot be
asserted in terms of a regular signifier, as this can only be elaborated within the set of
relations between signs. The empty signifier plays the role of ‘a signifier of the pure
cancellation of all difference’ by which a partial fixation is achieved (Laclau 1996, 38). It
has no determined content or place within a particular system of signs but it fixes this
system by forming a chain of equivalences between all of its elements. Second, the
empty signifier repeats this equivalential operation for the negated outside (Laclau
1996, 38–9). By excluding other possible articulations of a system, empty signifiers
constitute inside and outside by connecting apparently disparate signs. Third, this
requires that empty signifiers do refer not to particular signifieds but to the very fact
that the ‘origin’ of signification itself is only possible through this constitutive exclusion
(Laclau 1996, 39).
As such, empty signifiers are political precisely because they stand in for the impos-
sibility of articulating the fullness of any discursive system. They constitute the revisable
antagonistic limits between the inside and outside of particular political identities by
fixing relations between signs. It is this moment that Laclau calls a ‘chain of equiva-
lence’, by which disparate identities are held together by a particular signifier that, when
emptied of its content, unites these elements in referral to a provisional and contingent
unification (Laclau 1996, 42). It is precisely antagonism, the ontological predicate under
investigation here, that is enabled by the empty signifier. It is important to recognize that
Laclau conceives of ‘floating’ and ‘empty’ signifiers as two parts of the same movement.
Where empty signifiers involve the emptying of content, a floating signifier implies the
fullness that unifies a particular system while also being empty enough to unify disparate
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signs within a chain of equivalence. The unity of any system of differences is only
possible through a sign which, in its capacity as floating, articulates it and reveals the
impossibility of this unity, in its capacity as empty, at the same time.
Le´vi-Strauss plays a pivotal role here, for it is in his reading of Saussure’s linguistics
alongside the anthropology of Marcel Mauss that he develops the concept of the floating
signifier. Le´vi-Strauss argues that Mauss’s work reveals the role of the empty and
floating character of certain signifiers within symbolic exchange. In his analysis of
ethnographic material regarding the gift and how it obliges one to give, receive and
reciprocate, Mauss invokes the Maori term hau to act as an explanation for this obliga-
tion: ‘What imposes obligation in the present received and exchanged, is the fact that the
thing received is not inactive . . . it is the hau that wishes to return to its birthplace, to the
sanctuary of the forest and the clan, and to the owner’ (Mauss 2002, 15). This imposition
of obligation must be explained through reference to something non-intentional because
Mauss sees the gift as ‘total social fact’, a phenomenon which concerns ‘the totality of
society and its institutions’ rather than individual acts (Mauss 2002, 100). Where Mauss
takes the role of hau as the source of an explanation of the total social fact that moved gift
exchange, Le´vi-Strauss took hau not as specific to gift exchange but to symbolic
exchange in general, as ‘no more than the subjective reflection of the need to supply
an unperceived totality’ (Le´vi-Strauss 1987, 57). Where hau took the form of a non-
intentional explanation of individual acts of gift exchange, the empty signifier unifies
varies signs by subsisting beyond the difference between them. As noted, this signifier
halts the differences that constitute language:
man has from the start had at his disposition a signifier-totality which he is at a loss to know
how to allocate to a signified . . . There is always a non-equivalence or ‘inadequation’
between the two, a non-fit and overspill which divine understanding alone can soak up;
this generates a signifier-surfeit relative to the signifieds to which it can be fitted. (Le´vi-
Strauss 1987, 62)
This lack of equivalence between the totality of a signifying system and a signifier that
would unite this totality requires a term, like hau, which does not necessarily refer to a
‘real’ signified but rather the impossibility of signifying the totality of the system itself. It
is in this gap that the floating signifier is found, whose ‘role is to enable symbolic
thinking to operate despite the contradiction inherent in it’ (Le´vi-Strauss 1987, 63). This
floating signifier is central to antagonism precisely because it halts the system of dif-
ferences, and therefore produces a contingent totalization through one particular, hege-
monic articulation.
It is worth repeating that Laclau asserts a clear difference between floating and empty
signifiers that is only implied by Le´vi-Strauss. Nevertheless, the unifying function of the
empty signifier and the fullness represented by the ‘surfeit’ of floating signification are
both to be found in Le´vi-Strauss’s reading of Mauss. In addition to the post-structuralist
conception of the sign that is essential to Laclau and Mouffe’s positing of antagonism as
internal to all signification, the political value of the floating signifier as that which
creates a chain of equivalence is derived from Le´vi-Strauss’s understanding of symbolic
exchange. Despite these core elements of the theory of antagonism having roots in
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structuralist anthropology, this anthropological origin is not clearly articulated in Laclau
and Mouffe’s political ontology. This occlusion of reference to Le´vi-Strauss could be put
down to a reticence to go back on the post-structuralist influence central to the theory of
antagonism that Laclau and Mouffe put forward. But it is here that Judith Butler’s remark
regarding the uncritical appropriation of sources in the exchange between herself, Slavoj
Zˇizˇek and Laclau becomes particularly relevant (Butler et al. 2000, 159). To what extent
does this acquiescence to, and erasure of, an established reading of Le´vi-Strauss occlude
other avenues that his work can provide for political ontology? By tracing an alternate
line forward from Le´vi-Strauss, via the readings of his work suggested in the ontological
turn in anthropology, antagonism can be situated in a more generous, pluralistic under-
standing of political ontology. In turn, this will allow us to recursively identify the way in
which antagonism acts as a restriction upon the limits of the political.
An alternate path from Le´vi-Strauss to political ontology
The ontological turn in anthropology challenges this naturalist and transcendental read-
ing of Le´vi-Strauss that is oft accepted in post-structuralist circles on the grounds that the
central themes of structuralism are comparison and transformation.5 A biographical
remark demonstrates this dual tendency. In an interview Le´vi-Strauss noted that the
organization of the village of the Bororo, who he studied during his fieldwork, embodied
what would later become the structuralist method: ‘meeting the Bororo who were the
great theoreticians of structuralism – that was a godsend for me!’ (Wilcken 2010, 69). On
the one hand, this move is inherently comparative insofar as it ranks the systems of
thought specific to those groups Le´vi-Strauss studied besides his influences from the
Western tradition. This is what Descola has referred to as Le´vi-Strauss’s ‘symmetriciza-
tion’ of Western and non-Western modes of thought (Descola 2017).6 On the other, it is
transformative in that symmetricization puts the suspension of the ethnographer’s own
conceptual categories at the heart of anthropological experience. Comparison and trans-
formation are thus inextricable within anthropological practice.
This anecdotal remark has theoretical significance for our discussion of Le´vi-Strauss
in the context of political ontology, because it demands a shift towards the reconsidera-
tion of the ontological ramifications of structuralism beyond its critique by
post-structuralism. There are two elements to this rethinking of Le´vi-Strauss. First,
Le´vi-Strauss’s referral to the value of the specificity of the ethnographic context of the
Bororo emphasizes the oft ignored element of comparison in structural methodology.
Maniglier notes that Saussure’s discovery of the differential character of the signifier,
insofar as it only derives its meaning from its difference with other signifiers, implies
that comparison is the only method by which the identity of signs can be discerned
(Maniglier 2016, 425). Thus, for Le´vi-Strauss, anthropologist and not linguist, the
broader identity and meaning of any symbolic system and its associated practices, rituals
and behaviours can only be discerned through comparative methodology. This takes
structuralism beyond a method that needs to be applied to the cases to which it provides
a meaningful result (He´naff 1998, 17; Le´vi-Strauss 1968, 82). More crucially, it consists
in the discovery of the necessity of comparison due to the differential ontological
character of signs (Maniglier 2010). Comparison is not so much adopted but demanded
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by the structure of anthropological analysis itself; that systems of meaning only become
meaningful through comparison.
The lesson taken from this by Descola, however, is not that this ontology of difference
should be taken to be primary. Instead, it requires that we recognize that the common
sense ontological division between nature and culture is ‘an “artificial creation”’ and
distinct from ‘what ethnography teaches us about the multiple continuities between
humans and non-humans that are established in the cosmologies of many non-modern
societies’ (Descola 2009, 109). This leads to the cornerstone of his project, which
involves tethering structuralism’s tendency towards categorization and classification
to the comparison of a plurality of ontologies irreducible to those that prop up the
conceptual apparatus of the Western anthropologist. This leads him to formulate a table
of basic ontological schemas which articulate the possible relationships between human
and non-human entities in different manners. As a result of the different classifications at
work within these ontologies, for Descola, ‘sociality is not an explanation but, rather,
what needs to be explained’ because the distribution of relations between entities leads to
totally different conceptions of the limits of the social (Descola 2013, 248). We might
take as an example Le´vi-Strauss’s remarks in The Savage Mind, where he argues for the
equality of the schemas in which ‘matter and form, neither with any independent exis-
tence, are realised as structures, that is as entities which are both empirical and intelli-
gible’ (Le´vi-Strauss 1966, 130). Descola takes this logic and extends it, in order to claim
that by charting the difference in relations between entities that these varying ontologies
posit, one can begin to give a more fruitful account of how each ontology structures the
world of those who think through it.
Descola is somewhat of an outlier in this ontological turn in anthropology, insofar as
he places his focus on the classificatory and taxonomic aspect of comparison.7 For
Holbraad, Maniglier and Viveiros de Castro, there is a second lesson that the Bororo
example highlights. Le´vi-Strauss also asserts that the act of comparison is inextricable
from transformation. The Bororo embodied a conceptual system organized along differ-
ent principles to the Western philosophical tradition, pointing the way to the investiga-
tion of other logical systems through structuralist analysis, rather than reducing them to
the categories of the ethnographer. In Maniglier’s reading of Le´vi-Strauss, this transfor-
mation is necessary because ‘[a] structure is not an ensemble of rules that can be isolated
from their applications’, but rather a field of possibility that emerges only through their
applications (Maniglier 2016, 427). This means that, on the one hand, the meaning of a
particular structure can only be arrived at through juxtaposition and comparison. On the
other, it means that the anthropologist’s account must be just one actualization of the
possibilities represented by a particular structure. It cannot, therefore, be an identical or
accurate representation but rather a transformation of this field. Comparison is transfor-
mation because it must produce new concepts from this gap of understanding that
structuralism tries to think (Holbraad 2013, 248). An ethnography of an alternate ontol-
ogy cannot help but be a ‘recursive exercise of conceptual invention’ that challenges the
ability of the conceptual coordinates of the anthropologist to represent the worlds of
others (Holbraad 2013, 258).
We will refer to the methodological stakes of the claim that transformation is una-
voidable in comparison under the label of recursivity, as suggested by Holbraad. For
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Maniglier and Viveiros de Castro, Le´vi-Strauss’s Mythologiques is central to developing
this recursive image of structuralism (Maniglier 2016, 424–30; Viveiros de Castro 2014,
197–220). In these works, Le´vi-Strauss begins from a single Bororo myth and charts a
vast number of transformations that it undergoes in order to analyse and link a large
number of mythical narratives from the Americas. For Maniglier and Viveiros de Castro,
respectively, this analysis of myth puts forward a ‘system of systems of transformations’
(Maniglier 2016, 426) and ‘a structuralism without structure’ (Viveiros de Castro 2014,
203). True to the comparative structuralist methodology, myths are not isolatable repre-
sentations so much as a series of relations between terms that can only be made intel-
ligible through practice and comparison (Viveiros de Castro 2014, 127). This is made
clear by passage taken from the last volume of this series of works, cited by Viveiros de
Castro:
Properly speaking, there is never any original: every myth is by its very nature a transla-
tion . . . it does not exist in a language and in a culture or subculture, but at their point of
articulation with other languages or cultures. Therefore, a myth never belongs to its
language, but rather represents a perspective on a different language. (Le´vi-Strauss
1981, 644–45)
For Viveiros de Castro, this is the significance of Le´vi-Strauss’s Mythologiques, that
myth is ‘primarily translation’ (Viveiros de Castro 2014, 205). Hence, Le´vi-Strauss’s
attempt to chart mythical thought projects another ‘image of thought’ that is in stark
contrast to the rigidity often attributed to structuralist classification (Viveiros de Castro
2014, 77). A recursive methodology, therefore, does not seek to replace one ontology
with another but to attempt to think from the perspective of other ontologies in order to
‘gain a perspective on our own contrasts’, and thus engender the recursive transforma-
tion of our conceptual coordinates (Viveiros de Castro 1998, 1).
This account might strike the reader as overwhelmingly generous to Le´vi-Strauss,
given the presence of these themes in the post-structuralist accounts of language that
Laclau and Mouffe use to form their understanding of antagonism. Nevertheless, what it
highlights is an alternate understanding of the role of ontology which will demonstrate
how political ontology places limits on what is considered as political. It is important to
note that the definition of ontology used here diverges from a simple discourse on the
character of the metaphysics of being (Viveiros de Castro 2016, 54). Instead, it is seen as
‘a prepredicative experience, in that it modulates the general awareness that I may have
of the existence of the “other”’ (Descola 2013, 115). Here, any experience is mediated by
an ontological scheme that shapes the possible relations between entities in any partic-
ular world. The insight taken from this is that any social or political relation ‘will take
altogether different forms depending on the ontological, cosmological, and sociological
contexts in which they arise’ (Descola 2013, 281). Anthropology, therefore, is unique
insofar as it’s goal is to think from the perspective of these conceptual systems organized
by fundamentally different motivations and presuppositions (Descola 2005; Viveiros de
Castro 2011). Consequently, any ontology places limits on what can be considered as
political. This is a challenge to pluralist political ontology insofar as it appears to be
incompatible with this pluralist understanding of ontology itself.
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This points to an alternate path from Le´vi-Strauss towards political ontology to that
found in the work of Laclau and Mouffe. This route can be paved by applying the two
methodological principles introduced above to political concepts. The first is a compara-
tive approach to ontology, where classification testifies to plurality rather than simply
fixing the structural conditions of politics. Such a principle posits that we can reconcile
the clash between individual ontologies and pluralism by viewing ontological principles
through a pluralist lens. Crucially, by engaging in comparison, we do not only lend a
more generous eye to other ontologies but reveal hitherto unseen aspects of ontological
schemes both near and far (Descola 2012, 72–3). In turn, the second principle is that this
comparison must be recursive. When studying alternate political ontologies, the political
theorist cannot simply reduce them to a single, already-existing conceptual scheme.
Instead, the recursive method emphasizes the notion of transformation found in the late
Le´vi-Strauss’s analysis of myth, which provides an image of thought where conceptual
coordinates can and must be transformed in an engagement with other images of thought.
For the political theorist, comparison highlights the necessity of charting the plurality of
political ontologies in order do justice to the way in which each enables different con-
ceptions of the political, that in turn recursively demands the transformation of one’s
own conceptual coordinates upon this engagement with alter-images of thought.
The political ontology of potential affinity
A comparison of antagonism with the political ontology represented by what Viveiros de
Castro refers to as Amerindian perspectivism and its associated kinship system of poten-
tial affinity will demonstrate this recursive principle. Before this system of kinship can
be understood, however, the basic ontological coordinates of perspectivism must be
established, precisely because it is perspectivism that broadens the category of ‘other’
persons that can become affines (Lepri 2013, 304–5). This broadening of the category of
the person occurs through an inversion of the characteristics which Descola and Viveiros
de Castro attribute to naturalism. Within naturalism, cultural and symbolic activity is
limited to human subjects, whereas other entities are related on a purely materialistic
basis. Its basic assumption is of the existence of ‘a universal nature that is coded, or
adapted to, by a multitude of heterogeneous cultures’ (Descola 2012, 29). Conversely for
what Descola calls animism and Viveiros de Castro terms Amerindian perspectivism, the
category of personhood is not restricted to humans.8 The ‘basic presupposition’ of
perspectivism is ‘that nonhuman beings are persons’ (Viveiros de Castro 2014, 82).
While the animals and non-human entities to which this form of personhood is attributed
differs across the groups that may be considered as engaging in perspectivism (Viveiros
de Castro 2014, 57), what is shared between them is the absence of a universal distinction
between persons and non-persons, and the intersection of human and non-human per-
spectives (Lima 1999, 127). This distribution of personhood across species means that,
according to Viveiros de Castro, ‘[w]hat these persons see and thus are as persons
constitutes the very philosophical problem posed by and for indigenous thought’ of a
perspectivist form (Viveiros de Castro 2014, 56).
Perspective is pivotal here for two reasons. First, it is only from the perspective of
humans that animals appear as such. Animal species perceive themselves to be persons
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and do not see ‘us’ as human persons in the way that we do. Hence, the designation of
this system of thought as perspectivism; its main goal is not to classify and limit a
possible set of relations and identities within a single discursive system, but rather to
attempt to think through a multiplicity of possible perspectives. Second, a shared set of
cultural references is differentiated among these perspectives. For example, ‘what we
call blood is beer for a jaguar, what we take for a pool of mud, tapirs experience as a
grand ceremonial house, and so on’ (Viveiros de Castro 2014, 62). What is central here is
not a question of differing representations, but rather differing perspectives rooted in the
nature of the body of each individual species. Thus, while Viveiros de Castro and others
oft make reference to the shared possession of a ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ by both human and non-
human persons in perspectivism, this is a less a Christian or Platonic category and more
the point of view produced by different embodiments of personhood (Pedersen and
Willerslev 2012).
Before moving to how Viveiros de Castro expands perspectivism into a kinship
system, it is important to pause and consider the limitations of this general formulation
of perspectivism. Viveiros de Castro has been criticized for separating perspectivism
from the particularities of ethnographic context (Rival 2013, 95–7; Turner 2009, 17–9),
and the ontological turn has been criticized more broadly for abstracting from indigenous
ontologies, reifying individual lives as a set of ontological givens and separating aca-
demic from indigenous concerns (Aspers 2015; Graeber 2015; Todd 2016; Vigh and
Sausdal 2014). These criticisms echo earlier challenges to anthropological representa-
tion. Key here is Vine Deloria, Jr’s attribution of self-interested, university career
oriented aims to anthropologists studying indigenous populations in North America, and
the placing of the latter in a ‘conceptual prison’ not of their own making (Deloria 1973,
93). Anthropologists descend upon indigenous groups in order to confirm their own
biases and create abstract knowledge, rather than tackle the political and economic
questions facing their subjects (Deloria 1973, 98). Anthropology, for Deloria, is utterly
incapable of turning its gaze back upon itself and constituting a critique of modernity.
This claim has been moderated by others who, responding to the polemic character of
Deloria’s writing, claim that it is perhaps more productive to emphasize the lack of such
a critique rather than its impossibility (Biolsi and Zimmerman 1997, 14). Nevertheless, it
is pertinent to consider two consequences of the claims of both Deloria and the critics of
the ontological turn for Viveiros de Castro’s account of perspectivism, in order to frame
the limits of our use of his account of potential affinity. First, Viveiros de Castro’s
ethnographic investigations are limited to the Amazonian context (Viveiros de Castro
1993, 2014, 50, 2017, 255). While he draws upon a wide range of ethnographic data to
expand his work (Viveiros de Castro 2016, 198; Holbraad and Pederson 2017, 161), he
oscillates between defining perspectivism as a specific Amazonian concept and a more
general Amerindian category. Further, others have applied perspectivism beyond
Viveiros de Castro’s own ethnographic work, including studies elsewhere in the Amazon
(Fortis 2010; Kohn 2007; Vilac¸a 2005), Africa (Ignatov 2017) and Northern and Inner
Asia (Ste´panoff 2009; Holbraad and Willerslev 2007; Pedersen and Willerslev 2012).
For Deloria and the critics of the ontological turn, Viveiros de Castro’s conceptual
conflation of the terms Amazonian and Amerindian, and this expansion of
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perspectivism, conflicts with ethnographic evidence (Bessire and Bond 2014, 444;
Turner 2009, 17) and the autonomy of indigenous peoples.
Second, Deloria’s application of his general critique of anthropology to the specifi-
cities of animism deepens this claim. In his words:
Anthropologists, summarizing what they find in the Indian tradition, always call us ani-
mists, and that view is accepted by a great many people in the field of religion. We are put in
a cultural evolutionary framework, and then we are supposed to move from animism to
some great abstract conception of one god. The problem with that type of analysis is that it is
not an article of faith in any Indian religion that everything has spirit. What happens in the
different Indian religions is that people live so intimately with environment that they are in
relationship to the spirits that live in particular places. (Deloria 1999, 224)
This critique is pertinent because of the proximity between animism and Viveiros de
Castro’s concept of perspectivism, his association of perspectivism with a broad con-
ception of personhood often expressed through the notions of soul and spirit, and the
generalizing character that this is imbued with. However, this second criticism gives us
pause to think about the aims and scope of the category of perspectivism in response to
Deloria’s claim. On the one hand, with respect to the first half of the above passage, it
would be incorrect to claim that the versions of animism and perspectivism given by the
authors of the ontological turn are part of a social evolutionary chain. The authors of the
ontological turn actively criticize the social evolutionary approach which creates a
temporal hierarchy between ontologies (Turner 2018, 3–5). On the other, Viveiros de
Castro’s understanding of soul or spirit as the embodied capacity for a point of view or
perspective with which it possible enter into relations (Danowski and Viveiros de Castro
2017, 70–1) is close to what Deloria presents as characteristic of Indian thought. From
this perspective, it would appear that Viveiros de Castro is not far from Deloria’s own
position.
Despite these two points, Deloria’s claim that there is a lacuna between lived expe-
rience and anthropological writing still stands in the case of the ontological turn. There is
not space here to fully address these issues with respect to the validity of the ontological
turn for anthropology more broadly, but several points should be highlighted for our
purpose of pluralizing the ontologies used to understand politics. First, for the ontolo-
gical turn, the disjunction between lived experience and the accounts given of ontologies
is accepted as a primary theoretical premise. While, as its critics might suggest, it to
some extent reifies the distinction between ‘naturalism’ and other ontologies, it does this
in order to challenge the basis of that very distinction. For Matei Candea, this means to:
challenge our own ontological assumptions and in so doing, to take theirs seriously–which
means leaving them in a state of possibility, without reducing them to false or true state-
ments in our own terms. (Candea 2012, 120)
While the threat of abstraction and reification looms, this position ‘takes seriously’ the
claims of others by attempting to be vigilant towards, and openly challenging, the lines
drawn between positions ‘we do and do not take seriously’ (Candea 2012, 120). Second,
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and as a result, the account of kinship that follows must be seen as a theoretical and
conceptual construction that Viveiros de Castro creates in order to take perspectivist
thought as a serious challenge to other ontological categories, even if this involves a
degree of reification. While it is an academic enterprise, the authors of the ontological
turn seek to alter anthropology’s conceptual apparatus in such a way that aligns it more
clearly with other conceptions of what can be considered as political (Holbraad and
Pederson 2017, 295; Candea 2011). It is this strategic position that is adopted here for the
purposes of thinking about political ontology and how it curtails the possibility of
thinking other forms of the political.
With these limitations established, what are the attributes of a system of kinship
oriented around this potentiality for expressing a point of view that operates according
to vastly different lines to antagonism? The novel claim here is not that kinship is
political (e.g. Asch 2005; Sahlins 2008), but that, according with the consideration of
the ontological turn given above, this particular form of kinship provides the basis for a
decentring of the ontology of antagonism. According to Viveiros de Castro, what orients
the kinship systems that he associates with Amerindian perspectivism is ‘potential’ or
‘virtual’ affinity. This displaces the centrality of consanguinity, familial relations of
descent, over contingent ‘affinal’ relations that take place on the margins of the group,
privileging the establishment of alliances with affines that are not consanguinely related.
Within an understanding of kinship that is based in consanguineal descent, the internal
relations between mothers, sisters, fathers and brothers are more important than con-
tingent relationships established through exchange with the outside: ‘In this view, the
outside comprises pure negativity, an absence of relation’ (Viveiros de Castro 2016,
105). While essentialist versions of kinship have long been criticized and deconstructed,
rejecting the familial unit as a primary biological given and attributing consanguinity a
socially constructed character, what Viveiros de Castro claims is that the constructed
consanguineal unit is still privileged over similarly constructed affinal relations
(Viveiros de Castro 2016, 160–62). Contrastingly, within this kinship structure, con-
sanguineal relations are taken as constructed, but the category of potential affinity, or the
possibility for entering into relations with individuals that are not consanguines, is taken
as the given upon which this construction takes place. In Viveiros de Castro’s words,
‘affinity is natural, consanguinity is constructed’ (Viveiros de Castro 2016, 163).
This centrality of potential affinity, rather than consanguinity, means that within
Amerindian perspectivism kinship is structured by a primary difference or alterity that
is translated into relations. This is in opposition to the naturalist, consanguine positing of
identity as primary. This distinction is demonstrated by Viveiros de Castro through the
respective roles played by the terms ‘brother’ and ‘brother-in-law’ in these systems.
Within Western understandings of kinship, what brings an undetermined ‘other’ into a
determined relation is the unearthing of brotherhood as an underlying principle that
grounds any possible relation within a single, uniting term such as ‘the father, the nation,
the church’ (Viveiros de Castro 2016, 112). Relations are established by positing an
identity that subsumes differences within it. Whether it is taken as constructed or given,
there is a single term that is taken to cancel out alterity. Contrastingly, the organizing
figure of perspectivist kinship is the brother-in-law. The significance of the ‘-in-law’
suffix is that the difference between the other and its integration into a particular kinship
14 Philosophy and Social Criticism XX(X)
system is maintained rather than effaced. The emphasis on the brother-in-law means that
‘[c]onsanguinity must be fabricated deliberately; it has to be extracted from the virtual
background of affinity through an intentional and constructed differentiation from uni-
versally given difference’, a process which Viveiros de Castro claims is ‘necessarily
interminable’ (Viveiros de Castro 2016, 112–3). Potential affinity leaves the unity of the
group perpetually open due to this axis of virtual affinity, which is the continually
present possibility for new, actual kinship relations. Crucially, what is important in this
model of kinship is that ‘encompassment does not produce or manifest any superior
metaphysical unity’ (Viveiros de Castro 2016, 116). Rather than placing consanguineal,
identity-based relations as the primary goal, affinal kinship is organized along the poten-
tial for new relations with unidentified affines which maintain their alterity, rather than
subsuming it within a general category of identification.
This category of potential affinity is incredibly broad precisely because of the wide
potential for personhood within Amerindian perspectivism. This means that relations to
other entities are also mediated by the potential for affinity, often considered as central to
hunting and agriculture practices among perspectivism in the Amazon (Viveiros de
Castro 1998, 3) and elsewhere (Willerslev 2004). As foregrounded above, at stake here
is not the accuracy of the postulates that underpin this Amerindian ontology of kinship,
nor of the perspectivist claim that non-humans possess the capacity for personhood
articulated through different bodily natures. Instead, for potential affinity, the primary
organizing principle of group identity is not a subsumption of difference under a single
term, but the maintenance of this difference as the very basis of any potential identity.
Incredibly broad ontological postulates regarding personhood within perspectivism lead
to a kinship formation based on the non-identity of the group. Hence, we can distinguish
the assumption of identity, established through a given or constructed hegemonic term,
from the assumption of the wide-ranging potential for affinity as the organizing principle
of all relations.
A comparative and recursive analysis of antagonism from the
perspective of affinity
The benefit of this brief account of perspectivist affinity is not the derivation of alternate
ontological principles, but a recursive comparison with antagonism in order to demon-
strate the necessity of pluralism with regard to political ontology. Importantly, what must
be noted as important is not the accuracy of the account of perspectivist kinship given by
Viveiros de Castro, as, first, such an account is a theoretical construction created by the
anthropologist that can only ever be a transformation of its subject, according to the
postulates of structuralism. Second, here we are interested in the comparative and recur-
sive benefits of such an account, insofar as it may exert an influence on Western political
categories so that they might better incorporate other ontologies within the pluralist
political project. Hence, other images of thought can induce a recursive consideration
of our own ontological categories through the process of comparison.
Three key assumptions of antagonism can be reframed through this comparison, in
order to demonstrate how, as political ontologies, both antagonism and affinity place
limits on the constitution of the political. First, from the perspective of potential affinity,
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the political ontology of antagonism tends towards a consanguineal model of identity. If
antagonism is the primary moment of the political, then it is overarching identity that
must be taken to be its organizing principle, precisely because antagonism represents the
conflict between identities, however contingently they are articulated. While these iden-
tities are seen to be constructed rather than given, they tend towards the pole of con-
sanguineal identification rather than affinal difference. Cultural or political identity is the
ontological mediator within antagonism. By adopting perspectivism, one can attempt to
think through an image of thought where culture takes on a different political meaning:
that the overarching unification it represents is not the primary category of association
but the potential for the inclusion of a new perspective within a group that does not
reduce its alterity to a single term.
Second, perspectivism sheds new light on the role of hegemony in understanding this
cultural and universal mediation of particularities. What antagonism assumes is that
social relations cannot avoid fixing the symbolic expression of a set of signs under a
single hegemonic narrative (the ‘brother’ relation of the church and the nation). Conse-
quently, the only opposition to hegemony is more of the same: ‘radical politics consists
in a diversity of moves in a multiplicity of institutional terrains, so as to construct a
different hegemony’ (Mouffe 2013, xiv). Contrastingly, while hierarchical and sedimen-
ted relations are present when potential affinity is transformed into actual kinship ties,
the perspectivist model does not assume hegemony over relations as its main goal
precisely because it tries to think from the perspective of the other. The basic philoso-
phical, and political, problem of perspectivism is not to subsume particular differences
under a single hegemonic project but to express the possibility of a ‘counter-natural, and
cosmopolitical alliance’ (Viveiros de Castro 2014, 164). Viveiros de Castro calls this
counter-natural because in the system of perspectivist myth, the category of personhood
is an open-ended series of possible transformations across species, which demands a
cosmopolitical position precisely because there is potential for these worlds to form
relations from their position of virtuality. Where hegemony seeks to articulate antagon-
ism along the lines of a single narrative identity, potential affinity seeks to draw lines of
connection between differences that do not reduce these perspectives to a single view.
These lines of connection lead to the third contrast between antagonism and potential
affinity. Each is possessed of a different distribution between open and closed tenden-
cies. On the one hand, Laclau and Mouffe stress the importance of the hegemonic
stringing together of chains of equivalence, which is expressed in terms of a form of
identity close to consanguineal identity. On the other, Viveiros de Castro emphasizes
that the inclusion of alterity in a way which maintains the possibility for transformation
is central to potential affinity (Viveiros de Castro 2014, 144). Antagonism leads to the
fixing of a field of differences through the floating or empty signifier, whereas perspec-
tivism aims to constantly transform this field through incorporating potential affines.
Crucially, perspectivism’s attempt to understand the possible worlds of others highlights
the way in which the linguistic basis of antagonism reduces subjects to mere ‘tabula
rasae’ or ‘docile subjects’ that do not possess worlds until the fixing of a system of signs
(McNay 2014, 81). The structuralist interpretation of perspectivism assumes a pre-
existing world of meaning which constantly undergoes transformation, rather than a
structure of meaning imposed upon lacking subjects.
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Hence, while antagonism is articulated in a pluralist and radical democratic project, it
is one that foregrounds universalistic identity over affinal otherness, hegemony over
perspective, and closure over transformation. These three points of comparison are not
intended to support the idea that antagonism should, or even could, be simply discarded
as a form of political ontology and replaced by affinity. Instead, they are intended to
demonstrate that the full meaning of a particular political ontology cannot be considered
outside of a comparative methodology. In this case, antagonism cannot act as a fully
fledged pluralist political philosophy precisely because it bars this possibility. By claim-
ing that the realm of the political is defined by antagonism, Laclau and Mouffe export
antagonism to the political in general, as a transhistorical ontology of the political
(Balibar 2014, 187; Kioupkiolis 2011, 694). This tendency is exacerbated by arguments
found in Laclau’s understanding of populism, where ‘the political operation par excel-
lence is always going to be the construction of a “people”’ (Laclau 2005, 153). A
transhistorical form of politics is impossible, precisely because antagonism cannot
account for alternative political ontologies (Mckean 2016) which may underpin under-
standings of how subjects relate to one another beyond discursive antagonism (Norval
2007, 86), such as the position suggested by perspectivist kinship. As such, criticisms of
both Laclau and Mouffe’s maintaining of liberal democratic forms of politics (Day 2005,
70–6; Wenman 2013, 216) can be seen to stem from this ontological limitation.
Equally, it must be acknowledged that potential affinity must not be taken to be a
simple replacement for antagonism for two reasons. Politically, it cannot make space for
the competition between identities that is central to antagonism and agonistic pluralism
due to its neglect of the constantly shifting universality that this demands. Additionally,
for the perspective of both critics of the ontological turn and anthropology more gener-
ally, it must be recognized that a fine line must be trodden between unwarranted abstrac-
tion from the lives of those studied by anthropologists and the alteration of
anthropology’s own concepts in the name of the political struggles of the ‘other’. For
Holbraad and Pederson, there is value to be found in successfully walking this line and
getting one’s house in order, so to speak, insofar as adjusting the representative limits of
anthropology and ethnography is not a merely ‘scholarly’ act, but also a political one
(Holbraad and Pederson 2017, 196–97). The ontological turn is less interested in more
accurate representations of singular ontological schemes, than in showing how recursive
transformations of the conceptual categories held by anthropologists can be induced
through comparison (Holbraad and Pederson 2017, 292–93). The result, they claim, is
that the recursive transformation that concepts like perspectivism and potential affinity
can induce in our political categories is valuable for, and part of, a broader set of
engagements with indigenous politics.
Thus, the theory of antagonism, and political ontology more generally, has been
criticized for abstracting from the real conditions (McNay 2014) and norms (Cross
2017) of politics, and the ontological turn in anthropology falls prey to critiques of
modern anthropology (Deloria 1973) and similar claims from contemporary anthropol-
ogists (Aspers 2015; Bessire and Bond 2014; Graeber 2015; Todd 2016; Vigh and
Sausdal 2014). What are the consequences of responding to the problem of the closure
of the political by antagonism by reference to an approach which could also be seen as
abstracting from political conditions? The lesson for political theory to be taken from the
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ontological turn in anthropology is that it acknowledges its shortcomings and invites the
reconstruction of conceptual norms on the basis of the recursively induced by its com-
parison. On the one hand, this forces upon us the question of what kind of politics can
account for the ontological diversity attested to by thinkers like Viveiros de Castro, while
also taking the claims of indigenous thought seriously. This demands a serious consid-
eration of how the use of ontological reasoning places limits on what can be considered
as political, and how this can be undone by alternate ontological principles. On the other,
political theory’s contribution to the goals of the ontological turn in anthropology is the
possibility of building upon these recursive analyses in order to broaden the ontological
frames by which politics is understood. This could, in turn, lead to a more extensive
engagement with politics in a way that remedies the critiques directed at abstraction in
anthropology.
The recursive pay-off, therefore, of this comparison between antagonism and affinity
is that not just that neither can act as a fully fledged pluralist political ontology because
they cannot account for the political assumptions that the other makes. Further, it high-
lights a need for collaboration between anthropology and political theory in a way that
mutually complements the shortcomings of each. That is, the closing off of the political
from other ontological viewpoints by political ontology and the threat of a remove from
politics that occurs in anthropological abstraction. Both of these claims demand that the
alterity and plurality which both of these ontological turns valorize cannot be subsumed
within a single ontological position. Instead, pluralist political theory might benefit from
this democratization of the coordinates of thought itself, rather than seeking the final
ontological ground of the political. This version of political ontology would necessitate
adopting the comparative and recursive methodology generated from the rehabilitation
of Le´vi-Strauss by contemporary anthropology. If this approach is adopted, antagonism
and perspectivism can be seen as two complementary but contrasting ontological posi-
tions that are apt for particular circumstances, groups and political problems. The
renewed lesson of structuralism is that by democratizing the coordinates of the political,
political ontology might do better to think from the perspective of those whose political
struggles it is trying to support. By laying the foundations for this ontological pluralism
structuralism doesn’t necessarily have to lead to a single ontology. Rather than ground-
ing pluralism in ontology, ontology itself should be pluralized to produce a more dem-
ocratic understanding of political concepts. Without doing so, political theory risks




1. This turn is far from homogenous, encompassing Deleuzian (Widder 2012), Lacanian (Stavra-
kakis 2007), Liberal (White 2000) and leftist (Strathausen 2009) political thought, and addres-
sing themes ranging from the state (Hay 2014) to violence (Oksala 2012; White 2009).
2. While the argument below pertains mostly to the continental tradition, as Colin Hay notes, there
has been a remarkable turn across the discipline of politics to ‘a post-naturalist, post-positivist
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approach to social and political analysis premised upon the acknowledgement of the dynamic
interplay of structure and agency and material and ideational factors’ (Hay 2011, 474).
3. Classic accounts can be found in, for example, the work of Judith Butler (1999: 49–53) and
Jacques Derrida (2001).
4. For more general overviews of this turn from the perspective of anthropology, see the work of
Holbraad and Pederson (2017), the collection edited by Pierre Charbonnier, Gildas Salmon and
Peter Skafish (2017) and individual work of Charbonnier and Salmon (2014), Eduardo Kohn
(2015) and Maniglier (2014).
5. This is closer to a call for nuance than a total rejection of the reading of Le´vi-Strauss given by
the likes of Derrida. Viveiros de Castro claims that there is a shift towards transformation in
Le´vi-Strauss’s mature Mythologiques series (Viveiros de Castro 2014, 84, 197), whereas Des-
cola and Maniglier argue that this tendency is present throughout his work and in tension with
the more schematic aspects of his writing (Descola 2009; Maniglier 2016, 428).
6. For Latour’s introduction of the theme of symmetricization, see his We Have Never Been
Modern (1993).
7. According to Holbraad and Pederson, Descola’s quasi-transcendental approach to classification
places him outside of the ontological turn (Holbraad and Pederson 2017, 62–5).
8. On the difference between Descola and Viveiros de Castro’s respective classificatory and
political understandings of animism, see the work of Latour (2009).
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